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self- specific processes in both healthy and 
diseased conditions (Gusnard et al., 2001; 
Sheline et al., 2009; Irish et al., 2012). Each 
area of the DMN seems to be involved in 
different subfunctions of self-referential 
processing (van Buuren et al., 2010), and 
a detailed map of the anatomo-functional 
DMN subregions is currently in progress 
(Salomon et al., 2013).
Even though some methodological 
caveats should be properly addressed and 
hopefully solved in the next years as far as 
resting states are concerned (Northoff et al., 
2010, 2011), it is more and more evident 
that the boundaries between the percep-
tion of the “self” and the “other” should 
be pivotally found (also) around the CMS. 
Furthermore, being directly involved into 
both MNS and DMN, the self is at a cross-
roads between these two discoveries, and it 
is conceivable that in the near future such 
research on the self will be better valorized 
and further propelled through new insights 
that can directly derive from studying the 
MNS and DMN. The relationship between 
MNS and the self as well as its links with 
the study of the self and internal/exter-
nal stimuli started to be discussed both 
for MNS (Sinigaglia and Rizzolatti, 2011) 
and DMN (Qin and Northoff, 2011), but a 
synergy between researchers from  different 
subfields (of neuroscience and above) is 
strongly required to further look at the self 
through the mirror neurons and the DMN 
looking glass.
Remarkably, the first evidence of mir-
ror neurons was obtained in monkeys with 
electrophysiological studies (di Pellegrino 
et al., 1992) and then replicated on man 
with neuroimaging techniques (Kilner 
et al., 2009; but see also Lingnau et al., 2009), 
electrophysiological recordings (Mukamel 
et al., 2010), and cerebral stimulation 
devices (Cattaneo et al., 2010; Avenanti 
intriguing topic. Remarkably, the investiga-
tion on the self benefits from two of the most 
recent discoveries, both of them claimed to 
be serendipitous, made in the highly inter-
disciplinary field of  neuroscience: the Mirror 
Neuron System (MNS) and the Default 
Mode Network (DMN).
On the one side, the MNS mechanisms 
first unify execution and perception of 
an action, with a set of neurons, ranging 
from premotor and supplementary motor 
areas to primary somatosensory and infe-
rior parietal cortices, coding for a precise 
action and activated also in the observers’ 
motor system (Cattaneo and Rizzolatti, 
2009; Keysers et al., 2010). Although it has 
been sometimes misinterpreted (Rizzolatti 
and Sinigaglia, 2010), MNS is crucial for 
the study of the self. In fact,  frontoparietal 
mirror neuron areas are crucial for the 
motor-simulation mechanisms, as well as 
cortical midline structures engaged in self-
related information processing (Uddin 
et al., 2007) both in normal and pathologi-
cal brain, as it can be seen for example in 
autistic (Enticott et al., 2012; Gallese et al., 
2013) and schizophrenic subjects (Ferri 
et al., 2012; McCormick et al., 2012; Mehta 
et al., 2012).
On the other side, since 2001 it has 
been understood that when an individual 
is alerted though not actively engaged in 
cognitive tasks, spontaneously organized 
neural activity occurs in a unique constel-
lation of brain regions called DMN and 
involving the posterior cingulate cortex, the 
precuneus, and regions of the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (Raichle et al., 2001; for 
an account of its discovery please refer to 
Raichle and Snyder, 2007; Buckner, 2012). 
The DMN has been consistently reported to 
be related to self-referential processing. In 
fact, activations and deactivations of DMN 
brain regions have often been related to 
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A search for the word self in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy finds 1187 
entries: trying to give a complete definition 
of this concept is not so easy. It is a great 
puzzle that states who we are in the world, 
as Alice in Wonderland once argued, afraid 
she could not explain herself when she came 
across the Caterpillar. Unfortunately, we 
cannot use such an excuse. Furthermore, as 
neuroscientists, trying to depict the self from 
a scientific perspective seems to get harder 
and harder the deeper we get into our knowl-
edge of the brain’s structure and functions. 
Generally speaking, the self has been seen 
through different lenses, according to the 
dominant zeitgeist. Classical cross-cultural 
studies confirmed what was intuitively con-
ceivable: the concept of the self is highly 
varied across social groups and across tra-
ditions, mainly clustered around the well-
characterized dichotomy between western 
and eastern visions (Markus and Kitayama, 
1991; Baumeister and Finkel, 2010; Martínez 
Mateo et al., 2013), where the first is consid-
ered more independent and the latter more 
interconnected. In recent years, research on 
the self has significantly increased thanks 
to the cross-fertilization of disciplines that 
were once considered separated, such as phi-
losophy, psychology, psychiatry, and neuro-
science (Gallagher, 2011) and, to a certain 
extent, all the other neuro-related disciplines 
such as neuroethics, neuroesthetics, and neu-
roeconomics (Legrenzi and Umiltà, 2011). 
Old questions can now be addressed through 
recently developed – and still improving – 
technological tools falling under the term 
“neuroimaging,” such as positron emission 
tomography (PET) or functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI). As the self is by 
definition multifaceted and polyhedral both 
in space and time, the flourishing of new, 
twisted viewpoints is thus useful to further 
shape and deepen our knowledge on this 
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on the self deals with the more  intimate 
meaning of mankind and, quoting the 
writer Lewis Carroll, will make all of us once 
again “curiouser and curiouser” toward the 
wonderland of neuroscience.
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